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Drug Use and the Exclusionary Manque
In this unique consideration of two seemingly distinct subjects of legal
interest, the author examines what proves to be a significant statistical
and conceptual relationship between the sanctioning of victimless crimes,
and the invocation of the exclusionary rule. The author opines that the de-
bate surrounding the application of the exclusionary rule is, in part, a
manifestation of the individual inclinations and opinions of the various le-
gal thinkers concerning the fundamental validity of applying criminal
sanctions to the perpetration of certain "victimless" activities.
The confusion we thus generate in our own minds and lives, and in the
minds and lives of those we touch through our legislation, treatment, or
"common sense" could not be greater. For the folly into which we have
fallen is of truly gigantic proportions: we have dethroned God and the
devils. Our new goals and devils-our own creations, but mysterious mon-
sters all-are the drugs we worship and fear.1
This case has significance far beyond its facts and its holding. For more
than 55 years this Court has enforced a rule under which evidence of un-
doubted reliability and probative value has been suppressed and excluded
from criminal cases whenever it was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 2
The unlikely juxtaposition of the above quotes suggests a ne-
glected interplay of two perplexing problems that plague criminal
justice in the United States. Few people would disagree with a
statement that drug use in this country has increased dramati-
cally during the last 15 years. Few would agree, however, upon
what, if anything, should be done about it. Another similarly con-
troversial subject is the legal principle known as the exclusionary
rule. Although these areas of the law appear at first glance to be
essentially unrelated, a closer examination reveals a connection,
the study of which tends to clarify each area. This comment will
demonstrate that the debate concerning the efficacy of the exclu-
sionary rule is, in reality, merely a manifestation of another less
1. T. SzAsz, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY XV (1974).
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 412 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). On November 26, 1965, agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics entered Bivens' apartment and arrested him for alleged
narcotics violations. The agents manacled Bivens in front of his wife and children,
and threatened to arrest the entire family. The family's apartment was searched
without a warrant. Subsequently, Bivens was taken to the federal courthouse in
Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip
search. On July 7, 1967, a suit was brought in Federal District Court alleging the
arrest was "done unlawfully, unreasonably and contrary to law." Id. at 389.
aparent issue-the criminal status to be assigned to such "vic-
timless crimes" as drug use. To accomplish this end, a particular
format will be used.
As a first step, a capsule history of drug use legislation and en-
forcement will be presented. Such a history will more clearly out-
line a social context of drug use and official efforts to repress that
use. Next, the history of the exclusionary rule will be developed
as a useful counterpoint to the contemporaneous efforts at drug
control. Subsequently, an analysis of several cases and research
studies will be made which will suggest a certain degree of inter-
play between drug use and the exclusionary rule.
Once it is demonstrated that drug use and the exclusionary rule
can be related statistically and conceptually, Herbert Packer's
two models of the criminal process will aid in the organization of
the raw data comprised of history, research, and cases. 3
Finally, it will be suggested the confrontation over the exlusion-
ary rule is essentially a debate over the necessity for criminal
sanctions in various areas of the law. If the criminal sanctions are
perceived as unfair and arbitrary, the foundations of the Ameri-
can legal system are somewhat weakened. At least one authority
states that the inability to creatively resolve basic societal con-
flicts of this type has precipitated a crisis in the American legal
tradition. The result that the United States is no longer able to
maintain order and justice.4
The Criminalization of Drug Use
"The plain historical facts are that before 1914 there was no
'drug problem' in the United States; nor did we have a name for
it."5 The first federal control enactment was the Harrison Narcot-
ics Act of 1914.6 The Harrison Act was a tax statute that required
manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of opiates and co-
3. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 144-73 (1968). An expla-
nation of the two models is provided in a later section of this comment. See text
accompanying notes 79-102 infra.
4. Berman, The Religious Foundations of Western Law, 24 CATH. U.L REV.
490, 507 (1975).
5. Mr. Szasz is more interested in attacking the prevailing medical notions
about drug use or restriction than discussing its legal implications.
The subject matter of ceremonial chemistry is thus the magical as op-
posed to the medical, the ritual as opposed to the technical dimensions of
drug use; more specifically, it is the approval and disapproval, promotion
and prohibition, use and avoidance of symbolically significant substances,
and the explanations and justifications offered for the consequences and
control of their employment.
T. SzAsz, supra, note 1, at xv.
6. Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed
1970).
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caine products to register with the Treasury Department and to
keep records of transactions involving those substances. An ex-
emption from this requirement was allowed to licensed physi-
cians, provided the drugs were prescribed in the course of
professional practice.7 Pursuant to the Volstead Act,8 Treasury
agents expanded the modest sanctions of the Harrison Act until
an all-out war on drugs had developed. Additionally, the Narcot-
ics Division of the Treasury Department was influential in the ar-
ticulation of a narrow definition of the licensed physician
exception under the Harrison Act adopted in United States v.
Behrman,9 which restricted the freedom of doctors to prescribe
opiates for the mere symptoms of addiction.
Although Linder v. United States subsequently overturned
Behrman and called for a more liberal approach, it was not ac-
cepted as policy by the narcotics division.1 0
Swayed by propaganda, enforcement policies, and public opinion, lower
federal courts dismissed the implications of Linder. Few reputable doc-
tors cared to challenge existing enforcment practices because many of
their colleagues were being convicted and jailed for prescribing narcot-
ics. 1 1
In August, 1930, the Bureau of Narcotics was separated from the
Bureau of Prohibition as the result of scandals involving narcotics
7. King, The American System: Legal Sanctions to Repress Drug Abuse,
DRUGS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21 (1974).
8. National Prohibition Act of 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (repealed
1933).
9. 258 U.S. 280 (1922). In Behrman, the Court was persuaded to accept the
government's position that doctors would only administer controlled drugs to pa-
tients for symptoms other than addiction.
10. 268 U.S. 5 (1925). The Court unamimously rejected the conviction of Dr.
Charles Linder for prescribing morphine to a patient who was a government in-
former. The Court decided Dr. Linder had not transcended the limits of profes-
sional conduct and Congress had never intended to interfere with a doctor's
professional judgment. However, a Dr. Williams published a book criticizing the
Bureau of Narcotics' policy of prosecuting doctors for prescribing narcotics to ad-
dicts. Williams asserts that between 1918 and 1938 about 25,000 registered physi-
cians were prosecuted for violation of federal laws. While the number of arrests
cited by Dr. Williams cannot be confirmed, the Bureau of Narcotics' annual reports
suggests that physicians and pharmacists were major targets of arrest. H. WIL-
LIAMS, DRUG ADDICTS ARE HUMAN BEINGS (1939).
11. Reasons, The Addict as Criminal: Perpetuation of a Legend, CRIME IN
AMERICA 126 (B. Cohen ed. 1977). See also J. WEISSMAN, DRUG ABUSE: THE LAW
AND TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES 116-139 (1978). For a more thorough discussion of
the history of drug control in the United States see D. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DIS-
EASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL (1973) and R. KING, THE DRUG HANGUP:
AMERICAS FIry-YEAR FOLLY (1972).
agents.' 2 The reorganized agency was headed by Harry J. An-
slinger, former assistant commissioner of the Bureau of Prohibi-
tion. Anslinger was to remain the head of the agency for the next
thirty-two years. The official policy of the bureau quickly became
synonymous with Anslinger's personal philosophy. He felt the
drug user was an "immoral, vicious, social leper" who could not
escape responsibility for his actions and who must feel the swift,
impartial punishment.13 The result was that the Bureau of Nar-
cotics, through Anslinger, encouraged drug use to become a crimi-
nal activity.
During the 1930's a new "drug problem" evolved with the in-
creased usage of marijuana. The Bureau escalated its attack on
drug use by declaring marijuana as the newest "dangerous drug."
In its 1936 annual report the Bureau depicted the drug user as a
"violent addict."14 A section of the report dealt with marijuana-
linked crimes using shocking accounts of brutal murders and vio-
lent attacks to that resulted from marijuana use.15 The resultant
furor prompted Congress to respond with the Marijuana Tax
Act.16 Marijuana consequently became part of the same system
of enforcement that had previously controlled opium and cocaine
through the Harrison Act. The Marijuana Tax Act, placed a high
tax on the drug and created a new class of "criminals." Anslinger
considered marijuana use as "crime, beastiality, and insanity"
and considered its users as "degenerates."'17
In law the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had completely routed the forces
of evil. It had shaped a law to its liking and had even triumphed over the
scientific method which presumed to question the moral truths of the Bu-
reau. The atmosphere was so clouded that serious investigations into ma-
rijuana remained stifled for almost twenty years. The dedicated
entrepreneurs within the Bureau had sold their beliefs not only to Con-
gress and the public, but to a large part of the scientific establishment as
well.1 8
Little was heard of a "drug problem" again until the early 1950's
when the Kefauver Committee on Crime launched an investiga-
tion into narcotics and marijuana use, the results of which caused
a great deal of public apprehension. Anslinger supplied much of
12. J. WEISSMAN, supra note 11, at 126, n.6. A federal grand jury in 1930 re-
vealed narcotics agents had padded arrest records and were in collusion with ille-
gal sellers.
13. J. WEISSMAN, supra note 11 at 127.
14. "Sensational articles and newspaper accounts have harped upon the
theme of the 'dope crazed killer' or the 'dope fiend rapist' until the public has
learned to depend upon this sort of literature as it depends upon the output of fan-
ciful detective mysteries." Lindesmith, Dope Fiend Mythology, 31 J. CRIM. L. C. &
P. S. 199 (1940).
15. Reasons, supra note 11, at 123.
16. Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).
17. Schaller, The Federal Prohibition of Marijuana, J. Soc. HIST. 68 (Fall 1970).
18. Id. at 74.
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the information used by the committee.19 He testified that al-
though there had been a decrease in the addiction rate for a
number of years, the trend more recently was reversing itself and
with an alarming increase of addiction among "young hood-
lums. '20 As a result of the hearings, Congress passed the Boggs
Act, which fixed mandatory sentence ranges for all federal drug
violations.2 1 Other "get tough" legislation followed. In 1956, for
example, the Narcotics Control Act was passed and penalities
even more severe and inflexible were promulgated. 22
In early 1968 President Lyndon Johnson used his powers under
the Reorganization Act to abolish both the old Bureau of Narcot-
ics in the Treasury Department and the more recent Bureau of
Drug Abuse in the Food and Drug Administration. These were re-
placed by a single Justice Department related agency known as
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD).23 Later
in 1968, when Richard Nixon was elected President, another "war
on drugs" was proclaimed to combat a "serious national threat."
Robert DuPont, Director of the White House's Special Action Of-
fice for Drug Abuse Prevention could claim that President Nixon's
anti-drug program had met with success as witnessed by a sub-
stantial reduction in the number of heroin addicts.24 Professor
James Wilson praised the Nixon program as a model of narcotics
control. This program employed a two-pronged approach which
combined a massive law enforcement effort to reduce the availa-
bility of heroin with a similarly massive attempt to substitute the
use of methadone. 25 By 1976, however, DuPont found that heroin
19. Reasons, supra note 11, at 129.
20. Id. at 129.
21. Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767 (repealed 1970).
22. Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-725, 70 Stat. 567 (repealed
1970). The "get tough" approach was subsequently adopted by most states by en-
acting the Uniform Narcotics Law which was patterned after the federal law.
23. The agencies were merged to provide for more efficient and effective law
enforcement. The new agency was in the Department of Justice, where the crimi-
nal approach was continued. Reasons, supra note 11, at 131.
24. In 1969 the BNDD reported that there had been 68,088 addicts. In 1970 the
number was raised to 315,000 and in 1971 the total reached 559,000. According to
Edward Epstein what had happened was that the BNDD managed their data and
applied a new formula to the old 1969 data. Their assumption was that only about
one addict in five was known to authorities, so that the 1969 data was multiplied by
4.626 to yield the new "epidemic" total of 315,000. The next year the BNDD revised
the ratio of 8.2 and multiplied that figure by 315,000 to get the 1972 total of 559,000.
The same sort of data manipulation was later used to reduce the addict population
to prove the Nixon program a success. E. EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR 173-77 (1977).
25. J. WILSON, THINKING ABouT CRIME XV-XVI (1974).
use was spreading at an alarming rate despite the efforts by law
enforcement officials in the Nixon administration.
One reason the trends are so volative is that they are based on conjecture
rather than hard data. Indeed, the "alarming trend" of increased addiction
to which DuPont referred was the product of a politically induced change
in the statistical procedures used by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) to estimate the number of addicts, not of any
sudden jump in heroin use.26
Indeed, it appears that the BNDD, with encouragement from
the White house, had manipulated the statistics so as to produce
the appearance of a decline in the addict population in 1973. This
manipulation seems to have been motivated by political expedi-
ency.27
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
197028 was the first major drug legislation enacted since the Harri-
son Act. It removed the tax based method of control while also
eliminating all prior drug legislation. Although penalties for drug
use were generally reduced, drug use remained an essentially
criminal activity. A new Uniform Controlled Substances Act was
drawn up paralleling the federal law and bringing local drug en-
forcement within the federal framework.29
This summary of drug use legislation is not intended to down-
grade legitimate fears about increasing use of drugs in the United
States. Rather, it works to demonstrate that the efforts to control
drug use have consistently utilized criminal sanctions and that
legislation and enforcement efforts were often infused with politi-
cal rhetoric rather than with careful, scientific thought.
The Exclusionary Rule-Selected Judicial Opinions
The exclusionary rule first appeared as dicta in Boyd v. United
States.30 It was not, however, until 1914, in Weeks v. United
States, that an unanimous Court adopted an exclusionary rule
based on fourth amendment principles, rejecting the common law
doctrine that all evidence was admissible regardless of the man-
ner in which the evidence was obtained.31 The essence of the de-
cision was that enforcement of the law, with regard to search and
seizure, is subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court stated that federal courts could not sanction depar-
26. C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 175 (1976).
27. Epstein, supra note 24, at 177. Epstein has documented the Nixon "war"
on heroin in great detail, concluding that it was a cynical attempt to create the illu-
sion that the Administration was tough on crime.
28. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C.A. § 801 (1970) (Amended 1974).
29. Uniform Controlled Substances Act § 201 (1970).
30. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See note 49 infra.
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tures from the Constitution in the name of enforcement since
those very same courts were sworn to uphold the Constitution.
This argument was similar to later justifications of the exclu-
sionary rule founded upon the principle of "judicial integrity."32
The emphasis on a constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule
was explicit in Weeks where the Court stated:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles estab-
lished by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their em-
bodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
3 3
It is important to realize that the genesis of the exclusionary
rule was not specifically rooted in a concept of deterrence, as the
term was used in later cases.
Nevertheless, the constitutional basis of exclusionary rule was
not effectively articulated in the Weeks opinion and later deci-
sions consequently drifted into other rationales. The case of Wolf
v. Colorado, though primarily dealing with fourteenth amend-
ment problems, examined the basis for the exclusionary rule.34
Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion denied that the exclusion-
ary rule was explicitly required by the fourteenth amendment.
Rather, it was a requirement arrived at by judicial implication.3 5
In Justice Black's concurring opinion he declared that the exclu-
sionary rule was merely a judicially created rule of evidence and
not a constitutional requirement.36
In Mapp v. Ohio,37 the Supreme Court extensively discussed
the foundations of the exclusionary rule. Mapp required the
states to adopt the exclusionary rule and established this require-
ment as inherent within the fourth amendment. The Court's
opinion cited Weeks as part of an argument that supported the ex-
clusionary rule as a constitutional requirement. The Court ex-
amined the possibility of a government destroying itself through
disregard of its own principles, 38 referring to the government as a
32. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
33. 232 U.S. at 393.
34. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See note 51 infra.
35. Id. at 28.
36. Id. at 39 (Black, J., concurring).
37. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also note 53 infra.
38. Id. at 659.
teacher which could instill contempt for the law if it breaks the
law itself.39 For the first time the Court also spoke of the exclu-
sionary rule as a "deterrent safeguard." 40 While the constitu-
tional argument is central to the reasoning in Mapp, it is far from
clear what the Court intended as its rationale for the exclusionary
rule. It is not surprising that Mapp comes under attack from
those who object to the exclusionary principle generally and to its
efficacy as a practical deterrent to official lawlessness in particu-
lar.
With a new Chief Justice and a reconstituted Court, the oppor-
tunity to critique the rule was presented in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.41 The holding
in the case allowed a cause of action under the fourth amendment
for damages resulting from a Federal Bureau of Narcotics entry
and search of the petitioner's apartment, all of which occurred
without warrant. Chief Justice Burger took the opportunity in his
dissent to examine the exclusionary rule and to present an alter-
native. He stated the exclusionary rule was based on a theory of
deterrence. This basis, he asserted, was both "conceptually ster-
ile" and "practically ineffective." 42 His objections included con-
tentions that the rule did not apply any direct sanction to the
individual officer involved in illegal conduct, that the police could
not grasp the technical nature of the rule, that the rule was not
useful in large areas of law enforcement that does not result in
criminal prosecutions, and the rule was applied equally to flagrant
violations and to inadvertant errors.43 In effect the Chief Justice
stated that the exclusionary rule was unworkable and irrational.
As an alternative, he suggested adoption of the American Law In-
stitute's Model Pre-Arraignment Code.4 According to Chief Jus-
tice Burger, adoption of this model would narrow the application
of the exclusionary rule so it would apply only to substantial vio-
lations, based on a balancing of interests involved.
In United States v. Calandra4 5 the Court majority stressed the
rationale of deterrence, and the failure of the exclusionary rule to
act as a deterrent. The Majority determined that "the rule is a ju-
39. Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 485 (1926).
40. Id. at 648, 651.
41. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
42. Id. at 415.
43. Id. at 416-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Burger, Who Will Watch
the Watchman, 14 Am. U.L. REV. 1 (1964) for an earlier statement of the same
ideas.
44. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 8.02 (2) and (3) (Ten-
tative Draft No. 4, 1971), cited in 403 U.S. at 424. Under the Code, a court would
only grant a motion to surpress if the violation was substantial.
45. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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dicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a per-
sonal constitutional right of the party agrieved."4 6 The dissent by
Justice Brennan forcefully argued that the majority erred when
they treated the exclusionary rule as a mere judicial remedy
rather than as a constitutional right under the Fourth Amend-
ment.4
7
The foregoing analysis of exclusionary rule cases was intended
not to be exhaustive, but to indicate the shifting rationale be-
tween the Weeks and Calandra decisions. Weeks stressed intrin-
sic constitutional principles whereas Calandra presented the new
focus on the public policy considerations of deterrence. Neverthe-
less, Brennan's dissent in Calandra indicates that the debate has
not been resolved satisfactorily. Hopefully, examination of the di-
vergent views in this area will result in a fuller understanding of
the interrelationship between the exclusionary rule and drug use
crimes.
Those Protected by the Exclusionary Rule
As the above two sections amply illustrate, the criminalization
of drug use and the controversy surrounding the exclusionary
rule were topics that generated controversy. It is ironic, however,
that both drug legislation and the exclusionary rule were created
in the same year, 1914, and were conceived independently of any
common law tradition. Beyond the ironies of history and circum-
stance there can be seen a closer connection between drug use, as
a victimless crime, and the exclusionary rule. 8 Drug use is cur-
46. Id. at 348.
47. Id. at 360.
48. All attempts to define victimless crime have run into trouble. One sugges-
tion has been to designate crimes as victimless if there is no victim in the usual
sense. But Silberman observed:
Another formulation that has become popular in recent years is no more
helpful, i.e., that the activities in question should not be considered crimi-
nal because there is no "victim" in the usual sense. It is true that both
parties consent to transactions such as prostitution, gambling, and the
sale of heroin, but the same can be said of a number of other offenses not
normally categorized as "victimless crimes," e.g., bribery of public officials,
sale of stolen merchandise, and the illegal sale or possession of guns.
With these offenses, the fact that the "victim" consents to the transaction
does not mean that no one is harmed; the same may be said of prostitu-
tion, heroin sale and/or a number of other victimless crimes.
Silberman, supra note 26, at 187.
A more general definition would be those activities over which large segments of
rently recognized as one of the more obvious examples of vic-
timless crimes. Thus, it is enlightening, to look at major cases
discussing the exclusionary rule, listed below, to see if a correla-
tion can be drawn between the exclusionary rule and victimless
crimes (particularly drug use).
Case Basis for Original Search
1. Weeks v. United States49  Gambling Lottery Tickets
2. Nardone v. United States50  Smuggling Alcohol
3. Wolf v. Colorado5 l  Abortion (performed by a phy-
sician)
4. Elkins v. United States5 2  Obscene Motion Pictures
5. Mapp v. Ohio53  Lewd Books and Pictures
6. Wong Sun v. United Possession of Narcotics
States 54
Americans have disagreed as to whether the criminal sanction should be applied.
These activities have generally been labeled "sin" or "vice," and include gambling,
public drunkeness, prostitution, homosexuality and drug use.
49. 232 U.S. 283 (1914). Weeks was charged with using the mails for the pur-
pose of transporting chances in a lottery. He was arrested without a warrant at his
place of employment. Meanwhile police officers went to Weeks' residence and,
without warrants, entered his house on two different occasions during the day and
took possession of various papers and documents.
50. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Nardone was charged with the concealment and smug-
gling of alcohol. Evidence against Nardone was obtained from witnesses who had
tapped his telephone and overheard incriminating conversations. The trial court
admitted the evidence over objections by the defense.
51. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Wolf was a practicing physician specializing in obstet-
rics. The district attorney believed Wolf had been performing abortions. Officers
were sent to Wolfs office where they seized his daybook covering the years 1943
and 1944. These were seized without a warrant. They represented records of pa-
tients who consulted him professionally. The defense contended the seizure and
use of the daybooks was reversible error.
52. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). State officers were convinced that Elkins and Clark
had possession of obscene motion pictures. They obtained a search warrant and
searched Clark's house. No motion pictures were found but several tape and wire
recordings were seized. The state court held the search unlawful and the indict-
ment was dismissed. During the state proceedings, federal officers obtained a fed-
eral search warrant and seized the evidence from a safe deposit box where the
state officers had placed them.
53. 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961). Three Cleveland police officers arrived at the
Mapp's residence seeking to question the Mapps about a recent bombing. Ms.
Mapp denied the officers entry. Later that afternoon the officers forcibly entered
the house without a warrant. Ms. Mapp's attorney arrived at the house but the of-
ficers refused to permit the attorney to see Ms. Mapp. Ms. Mapp was forcibly
taken upstairs to her bedroom where the officers searched the room. The search
spread to the rest of the second floor where the obscene materials seized were ul-
timately found.
54. 371 U.S. 471, 473 (1963). Federal narcotics agents arrested one Hom Way
for heroin possession. Hom Way said that he had received heroin from one Toy.
Agents went to Toy's laundry, broke down the door, and arrested Toy. Toy impli-
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7. Bivens v. Six Unknown Suspicion of Narcotics Posse-
Agents5 5  sion
8. United States v. Calandra5 6  Illegal Gambling
9. United States v. Janis5 7  Book Making
It is not unreasonable that the criminal charges in all the cases
listed above could be styled as victimless crimes. 58 The three ma-
jor categories that are evident are: gambling, pornography, and
drug use. It is tempting to argue that the above crimes should ap-
pear most often, since mere possession of gambling equipment,
drugs or obscene material is the essence of the crime itself, and
those activities would naturally become the object of more
searches and seizures. Robbery, burglary, larceny and receiving
stolen goods are also crimes that in one way or another involve
possession of goods that would be the subject of searches and
seizure. Yet these crimes do not appear in the list at all.
The listing of major cases and the attendant criminal charges is
illustrative of the relationship between victimless crimes and the
invocation of the exclusionary rule. One case in particular has
provided a significant insight into the debate over the exclusion-
cated Yee, who in turn implicated Wong Sun as the one who had provided Yee
with the heroin. Several days later when Wong Sun was being interrogated, after
being advised of his legal rights, he gave an unsigned confession.
55. See note 2 supra.
56. 414 U.S. 338, 340 (1974). Federal agents obtained a search warrant to
search the place of business of Mr. Calandra. Calandra was suspected of con-
ducting extensive illegal gambling operations. The object of the search was the
seizure of bookmaking records or paraphernalia. The agents discovered no book-
making evidence, but instead found some evidence of loansharking activity. Ca-
landra refused to answer questions about loansharking activities before the grand
jury, stating that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. The trial court re-
fused to make Calandra answer the questions, but the Supreme Court reversed.
57. 428 U.S. 433, 434 (1976). Los Angeles police officials obtained a warrant,
based on an affidavit made by an officer, to search the Janis apartment for book-
making evidence. Betting records were found and Janis was arrested. However,
the warrant was subsequently quashed on the grounds that the affidavit did not
contain sufficient detail for the issuing magistrate to make an independent judg-
ment about the information supplied. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), was not
listed because the holding was limited to the narrower issue of whether the exclu-
sionary rule could have been raised in a federal habeas corpus petition where the
defendant had an opportunity for full and fair litigation of fourth amendment
claims in the state court.
58. Although some may consider abortion a crime with a victim, the court in
Roe v. Wade dispensed with abortion as violation of criminal law and announced
that it was permissible under the mother's constitutional right to privacy. 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
ary rule and has provided valuable research information which
connects the rule with drug use and other victimless crimes. As
previously mentioned, Chief Justice Burger used his dissent in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents as a vehicle to announce his oppo-
sition to the exclusionary rule.59 Chief Justice Burger's dissent is
well summarized by his quotation of Cardozo:
The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered . . . A
room is searched against the law and the body of a murdered man is
found . . . . The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the mur-
derer goes free.
6 0
Bivens is a decision whose importance reaches beyond the facts
of the case itself. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger buttressed
his argument that the exclusionary rule did not deter unlawful
police conduct by citing Professor Oaks who expressed "dis-
enchantment" with the rule.6 1 The research by Oaks lent convinc-
ing empirical evidence to the assertion that the exclusionary rule
failed as a deterrent, yet provides evidence of a relationship be-
tween the exclusionary rule and drug use.62 While Oaks focused
his research on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, he
also presented statistics that indicated the use of the rule was
concentrated in three crimes.
Court statistics show the astonishing extent to which the exclusion of evi-
dence-as measured by the incidence of motions to suppress is concen-
trated in a few crimes.
[The statistics show] that over 50 per cent of the motions to suppress in
Chicago and the District [of Columbia] were filed in cases involving nar-
cotics and weapons, even though these crimes accounted for a compara-
tively small proportion of the total number of persons held for
prosecution. In Chicago an additional 26 per cent of the motions to sup-
press were filed in gambling cases, which account for only I per cent of
the national total of persons held for prosecution. 6 3
In Chicago narcotics, gambling and weapons offenses accounted
for 78% of all motions to suppress. In the District of Coumbia
these crimes accounted for 64% of all motions to suppress. 64 It is
59. 403 U.S. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
60. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y.2d 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1925), cited in
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 413.
61. 403 U.S. at 426-27.
62. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665 (1970). Oaks' study is widely cited and concludes (although the data
neither supported nor reputed the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule) that
the rule was a failure as a deterrent.
63. Id. at 681, 683. The weapon related crimes in Oaks study were for the pos-
session of weapons, not for the use of weapons in separate crimes. However, it
could be argued that the weapons had the potential to be involved in various
crimes and the crimes should not be termed as "victimless." Even if the weapons
category was not considered a victimless crime, the two crimes of gambling and
narcotics use still account for 50% of the motions to suppress in the Oaks study of
Chicago.
64. Id. at 682.
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clear that if the courts are freeing criminals because of the exclu-
sionary rule, only certain types of criminals are being freed.
A subsequent study by Professor Spiotto examined only data in
Chicago and used a more extensive base.65 The Spiotto research
concluded that the exclusionary rule did not deter police misbe-
havior. It also provided some enlightening data on the increase of
motions to suppress for illegal search and seizures in specified
categories. Spiotto chose a three month period during 1971 and
calculated the percentage of all motions to suppress for a variety
of crimes. For preliminary hearings the data was: narcotics -
57%, unlawful possession of weapons - 23%, and gambling - 16%.
These three categories again accounted for a large percentage
(96%) of the motions to suppress. 66 More importantly, the data
Distribution of Motions to Suppress Among Various Crimes in Chicago and
District of Columbia, 1969-70
Proportion of
Proportion of Total Persons
Total Motions Held For
to Suppress Prosecution
District of (United
Offense Chicago Columbia States)
Narcotics 24 35 1
Weapons 28 26 1
Gambling 26 4 1
Disorderly Conduct 11 * 10
Theft, Burglary,
Receiving and Other
Property Offenses 4 19 15
Assault 1 6
Two or More of
Above Crimes * 5b-
7a * 66
All Other Crimes
Total 100 100 100
(649 motions (69 motions (2.3 million
in 12 court in 12 months) persons)
days)
* Signifles less than .5%
a No other category exceeded 2%
b Consists of motions in cases involving two or more types of charges; property
and narcotics, 4%; property and weapons, 3%; property and assault, 3%; other
combinations, 5%.
65. Spiotto, Search & Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973).
66. Id. at 250. Once again the unlawful possession of weapons could be con-
159
indicates that arrests for drug use occupy an increasing percent-
age of the court challenges to the exclusionary rule. As Spiotto
observed:
Narcotic offenses reveal both the largest number of motions made and the
highest percentage sustained in the selected courts. Unlawful possession
of a gun ranked second in the number of motions to suppress made, but
only 61 percent were sustained.
In Narcotics Court, while the number of motions to suppress made was
roughly proportional to the number of defendants in each category of of-
fense, defendants charged with the more serious narcotics offenses such
as possession of heroin (the second most common narcotics offense), had
100 per cent of their motions granted, while those charged with less seri-
ous narcotic offenses had a lower percentage granted (possession of mari-
juana felony: 78 per cent; possession of dangerous drugs: 56 per cent;
possession of marijuana misdemeanor- 93 per cent).6 7
The Spiotto article was an unabashed attack on the efficiency of
the exclusionary rule as a deterrent. The Oaks research analysis
came to no general conclusion about the efficiency of the rule as a
deterrent, but, nonetheless, held for its abolition.68 Chief Justice
Burger used this reasoning in Bivins to suggest that the exclu-
sionary rule had failed as a deterrent.
A contrary view was taken in an article by Bradley Canon, who
sought to demonstrate that the Oaks and Spiotto studies were
flawed, primarily because their evidence was drawn from an in-
sufficient sample.69 Of more immediate concern, Canon's obser-
vations linked the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule with
narcotics use. Canon stated:
As an explanatory factor, the narcotics phenomenon is not mutually ex-
clusive to the exclusionary rule. While increased use of narcotics is un-
doubtedly the immediate cause behind the increase in the use of search
warrants in a great many cities, it can be asked: why do police seek
sidered a suspect category. If possession of weapons was dropped from considera-
tion, gambling and narcotics still accounted for 73% of the motions to suppress.
67. Id. at 262.
68. Oaks, supra note 60, at 755.
69. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a
Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 698 (1974). The Canon arti-
cle is a determined effort to repute critics of the rule and cast doubt on the viabil-
ity of past empirical research on the deterrence factor of the exclusionary rule.
Canon mentioned an earlier study carried out by Columbia University Law School
students; Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices
in Narcotics Cases, 4 COL. J.L. Soc. PROBS. 87 (1968). In that study the students
found that the number of post-Mapp narcotics arrests declined about 50% accord-
ing to the Narcotics Bureau, although Uniform and Detective Bureaus were sub-
stantially unchanged. What had changed was the content of police reports. Before
Mapp arrest reports indicated 40% of the contraband was hidden on the person or
in the premises. The figure dropped to around 10% after Mapp. Also reports that
the defendant dropped or otherwise visably disposed of the evidence climbed from
10% (pre-Mapp) to about 35% (after Mapp). Id. at 94. Canon believes that the
exclusionary rule had a great impact on narcotics arrests in New York City; if only
at the level where police took notice of it and then fabricated their testimony to
match Mapp requirements. For further discussion see Comment, Police Perjury in
Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507 (1971).
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search warrants in narcotics cases rather than operating without them. In
good part at least the answer lies with judicial decisions governing the le-
gally seized material from evidence. In other words, the narcotics phe-
nomenon explains to a large extent the tremendous increase in police use
of search warrants during the past half dozen years, but it does not ex-
plain police decisions to seek search warrants rather than operate without
them. The exclusionary rule explains this.
70
A Suggested Model
What has been suggested in the preceeding section is that there
exists a significant statistical connection between drug use crimes
and the employment of the exclusionary rule through motions to
suppress at preliminary hearings or at trial.71 The bare assertion
of a statistical correlation, however, has not resolved the ambigu-
ity about drug use crimes and the exclusionary rule. On the one
hand the exclusionary rule was thought to uphold judicial integ-
rity and to a minor extent, maintain deterrence. But another judi-
cial faction stressed deterrence in preference to the judicial
integrity doctrine. Moreover, the Court in Mapp thought the ex-
clusionary rule would work as a deterrent, although they did not
specifically indicate whether the rule was for deterrence or for ju-
dicial integrity. More recently, Chief Justice Burger has led the
attack against the rule based upon his view that it has failed as a
deterrent to police misadvanture. Threading its way through the
legal controversy has been the implacable fact that discussion
concerning the exclusionary rule cannot be separated from the
actual defendants for whose benefit the rule was intended.
The center of the controversy and its implications has been po-
litical in the broadest sense. President Gerald Ford, for example,
epitomized one aspect of the political drama when he spoke
before Congress in 1975. Ford stated that: "For too long, law has
centered its attention more on the rights of the criminal defend-
ant than on the victim of crime. It is time for law to concern itself
more with the rights of the people it exists to protect."72 Charles
Silberman suggested that such arguments, in reality, express ide-
ological preferences rather than actual facts since few criminals
actually escape punishment because of the exclusionary rule.73
70. Canon, supra note 67, at 714. For evidence of the heavy role of narcotics in
search and seizure problems in Los Angeles see Silberman, supra note 22, at 264.
71. See notes 63, 66 supra.
72. The President's Special Message to the Congress (June 19, 1975), reprinted
in 11 WEEKLY COMPILATON OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 653 (1975).
73. Silberman, supra note 22, at 262. Silberman musters impressive evidence
In a similar vein, another authority has asserted that the debate
about drug use reflects myths derived from different segments of
an acquisitive and competitive society.7 4
When a specific area of legal controversy is also a subject of
broad political importance, statistical evidence should be supple-
mented by a conceptual scheme. Judge David Bazelon has ob-
served: "Society is inhabited by human beings, and its problems
are therefore human problems. Crime cannot be understood
merely as a class of statistical events."7 5 What is necessary is a
from studies that in fact, for crimes against the person or against property, the ex-
clusionary rule does not let criminals go free in those categories. The one signif-
cant exception is for drug use crimes where the rule does have a more important
place. Id. at 264.
74. Professor Incardi stated that these beliefs emerged from various sources:
[FIrom the more rural creeds of nineteenth-century Methodism, Baptism,
Presbyterianism, and Congregationalism which emphasized individual
human toil and self-sufficiency while designating the use of intoxicating
substances an an unwholesome surrender to the evils of an urban moral-
ity;
[F]rom the medical literature of the late 1800's which arbitrarily desig-
nated the use of morphine and opium as a vice, a habit, an appetite, and a
disease;
[F]rom the early association of opium smoking with the Chinese-a cul-
tural and racial group which had been legally defined as alien until 1943
and even today is perceived of as odd and mysterious;
[F]rom the direct effects of American narcotics legislation which served to
define all addicts as criminal offenders;
[F]rom nineteenth- and twentieth-century police literature which stressed
the involvement of professional and habitual criminals with the use of
drugs;
[Firom the initiative of moral entrepreneurs and moral crusaders who de-
fined drug use.as evil, and hence influenced and directed the perceptions
of both local and national opinion makers and rule creators;
[Firom the publicized findings of misguided research efforts, those con-
taminated by the use of limited and biased samples, impressionistic data,
methodological imbalances, and inexperienced practitioners;
[F]rom the sacred repository of intellectual and cultural lag-the gap
which persists between the generation and publication of new data and ul-
timate dismissal of earlier proclamations;
[F]rom the suppression of controversial or disquieting knowledge by the
cohorts of private, public, and corporate bodies whose internal interest
structures are more effectively supported by alternative and distorted con-
ceptions of reality.
J. Incardi, Drugs, Drug-Taking and Drug-Seeking: Notations the Dynamics of
Myth, Change and Reality in DRUGS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 206
(1974).
75. Bazelon, The Hidden Politics of American Criminology, in THE EVOLUTION
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18 (1978).
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conceptual model that can make sense of the devisive debate over
the exclusionary rule and at the same time incorporate the statis-
tical evidence. A suitable conceptual framework has been devel-
oped by Herbert Packer.76 Packer has developed two models of
the criminal process which he designates as the Due Process
Model and the Crime Control Model. These models are conceived
as polar opposites of the reality they represent. Packer acknowl-
edges the difficulties inherent in polarization, stating: "There is a
risk in an enterprise of this sort that is latent in any attempt to
polarize. It is, simply, that values are too varied to be pinned
down to yes-or-no answers. The models are distortions of real-
ity."' 77 Yet, Packer has attempted to clarify the discussion of the
criminal process by isolating the assumptions that underlie "com-
peting policy claims" and examining the conclusions that follow
from his analysis.7 8
1. The Crime Control Model
The principal concern of the Crime Control Model has been the
suppression of criminal conduct. This is the most important func-
tion of the criminal process. Suppression of criminal conduct pre-
serves social order and is, thus, a "positive guarantor of social
freedom."79 Primary consideration should be given to efficiency.
In order for the model to operate successfully it must produce a
high rate of apprehensions and convictions. There should also be
a minimum opportunity for challenge to promote finality. The
model presumes guilt upon arrest because of the high value
placed upon initial administrative fact-finding processes. In order
to enhance the administrative fact-finding process it is of crucial
importance to limit restrictions on police and prosecutors, except
for those which promote reliability.8 0
The Crime Control Model has many laudable aspects, espe-
cially in its emphasis on public security and the general knowl-
edge by the public that criminals will be punished. The model
does not, however, delve too deeply into the nature of the crime.
76. H. PACKER, THE LiMIs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149 (1968). FOR THE
ORIGINAL FORMULATION see Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 (1964).
77. H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149, 153 (1968).
78. Id. at 154.
79. Id. at 158.
80. Id. at 162.
In its most pristine state the theory behind the model assumes
the inherent rationality of the criminal sanction. Any questions
concerning the proper limits of the criminal sanction are pre-
sumptively entrusted to the legislature.
One would be hard pressed to find a more vigorous champion of
the Crime Control Model than Chief Justice Burger. Although his
critical stance toward the exclusionary rule has been evidenced in
other decisions, notably Brewer v. Williams,8 1 his most effective
dissent to date remains that in Bivens.8 2
In this opinion, the Chief Justice, after allotting one paragraph
to his dissent from the actual holding in the case, devoted the re-
mainder of his energies to criticizing the exclusionary rule, even
though the rule was not directly at issue in the case.8 3
Some clear demonstration of the benefits and effectiveness of the exclu-
sionary rule is required to justify it in view of the high price it extracts
from society-the release of countless guilty criminals. But there is no
empirical evidence to support the claim that the rule actually deters ille-
gal conduct of law enforcement officials.
8 4
For the Chief Justice, the important aspect of evidence is its
probative value and reliability. He placed a high value on the ad-
ministrative fact-finding capabilities of the prosecution, just as
would an adherent of the Crime Control Model. Chief Justice
Burger has chosen to view the exclusionary rule as having pro-
moted inefficiency in the criminal process and as having blocked
the societal goal of repressing criminal conduct. He felt the rule
did not even inhibit the wrong-doing official. The Chief Justice
quoted the plurality opinion in Irvine v. California for support.85
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing official,
while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant. It de-
prives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been
pursued by another. It protects one against whom incriminating evidence
is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons who are the
victims of illegal but fruitless searchers.
8 6
Chief Justice Burger tended to reduce the debate over the ex-
clusionary rule to the single issue of deterrence. The rule's foun-
dation was not to foster judicial integrity, referred to by the Chief
Justice as the "sporting contest theory," but rather to deter offi-
81. 430 U.S. 387, 415-29 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
82. 403 U.S. 388, 424 (1971) (Burger, C.J., appendix to dissenting opinion). The
appendix presents fifteen different articles critical of the exclusionary rule. Also
included is the seminal work by Oaks, supra note 62, from which Burger sought an
empirical foundation for his views.
83. What was directly at issue was whether Bivens had a federal cause of ac-
tion for damages after a wrongful invasion of Bivens' residence by narcotics
agents. It was to this issue that the majority addressed itself.
84. 403 U.S. at 416.
85. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
86. Id. at 136.
[Vol. 7: 147, 1979] The Exclusionary Manque
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
cial misconduct. 87 Chief Justice Burger thought if the exclusion-
ary rule did not deter misconduct, then it was inefficient and
should be replaced. Although a pure Crime Control Model might
ignore police misconduct, the Chief Justice's views have definitely
validated the criminal sanction of the model. His reliance on the
criminal sanction and on administrative fact finding has put Chief
Justice Burger squarely in the camp of Crime Control advocates
provided by the Oaks study to justify his contention that the rule
fails to deter improper police conduct.88 However, the very same
study indicated that two crimes, gambling and narcotics use, ac-
counted for the majority of the motions to suppress the evi-
dence.89 This aspect of the Oaks study was curiously overlooked
by the Chief Justice, who was more concerned with the possibil-
ity that murders and the like might go free because of minor pro-
cedural errors. The Oaks study does not support such a
conclusion. 90
Chief Justice Burger has been consistent in terms of the Crime
Control Model. Having reduced the argument to the single issue
of deterrence, his only desire has been to point out the lack of effi-
ciency inherent in the rule and to raise the spectre of murderous
criminals being set free. The Chief Justice's constant reference to
murderers were probably meant to be evocative of the possibility
that any criminals who had committed serious crimes against
property and the person might be set free.
A likely explanation for Chief Justice Burger's position would
be a rationale consistent with the Crime Control Model, namely
that a crime is a crime. Although Chief Justice Burger may men-
tion murder in order to evoke his sense of outrage that guilty de-
fendants should go free because of technical procedural errors, it
is most likely that he felt that drug users, when guilty, should be
punished with certainty and efficiency like any other criminals. It
has been this particular reluctance to distinguish between crimes
and the imposition of the criminal sanction that has been the hall-
mark of the Crime Control Model. Primary attention in this
scheme is devoted to the orderly administration of justice. A
careful look at the propriety of the criminal sanction to certain ac-
87. 403 U.S. at 415.
88. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665, 667 (1970).
89. Id. at 675.
90. 403 U.S. at 413.
tions will not be forthcoming. The criminal sanction is treated as
a given. Chief Justice Burger's interest was not to question when
the rule was invoked or even for what kinds of crimes, but rather
to demonstrate, ". . . the suppression doctrine as an anomalous
and ineffective mechanism with which to regulate law enforce-
ment ".... 91
The difficulty with the Crime Control Model in general and in
particular, with the Chief Justice's view of the exclusionary rule
is the lack of well defined ends (i.e., the "suppression of crime")
to place alongside well articulated, administratively efficient
means. Chief Justice Burger and other Crime Control Model ad-
vocates have failed to confront the empirical reality that the cor-
relation of the exclusionary rule with drug use crimes presents.92
For example, Chief Justice Burger mentions drug use only once
in Bivens, not in relation to the facts of the case or the research
cited, but as a metaphor to suggest the gradual relinquishment of
the exclusionary rule is like narcotics withdrawn.93
2. The Due Process Model
The Due Process Model is the opposite of the Crime Control
Model. Essentially, the Due Process Model rejects the informal
fact-finding processes of the police and prosecution as definitive
of factual guilt. Rather, this model insists on formal, adversary
fact-finding in an impartial tribunal, in order to eliminate or re-
duce mistakes to the greatest possible extent.94 The Due Process
concept is best characterized as upholding the primacy of the in-
dividual while limiting official power.95 More importantly, the
criminal, adjudicative process is viewed as the appropriate forum
for correcting its own abuses. 96 Moreover, the Due Process Model
exhibits a skepticism about the morality and utility of the crimi-
nal sanction in some of its applications.97
Two cases stand out as illustrative of the Due Process Model.
Weeks v. United States,98 the first case to articulate the exclusion-
91. Id. at 420.
92. See J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975); E. VAN DE HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS (1975).
93. "[I]n a sense we are in a situation akin to the narcotics addict whose de-
pendence on drugs precludes any drastic or immediate withdrawal of the sup-
posed prop, regardless of how futile its continued use may be." 403 U.S. at 421.
94. Packer, supra note 76, at 164. The Due Process Model has focused on the
possibility of human error during the fact-finding process. In a pure Due Process
Model, all allegations of factual error would be determined by adjudicative hear-
ings. Thus, the demand for finality in proceedings is in this model.
95. Id. at 165.
96. Id. at 167.
97. Id. at 170.
98. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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ary rule, suggested that officials of the federal government ought
not to profit from lawless behavior. Judicial integrity depends
upon the government obeying its own laws. The Court stated:
[T~he duty of giving to it [the fourth amendment] force and effect is obli-
gatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement
of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to
unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Consti-
tution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which
people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such
fundamental rights.9 9
Even more important, from the standpoint of the Due Process
Model, was the Court's insistence that the judiciary could cure
the abuse of official lawlessness through the imposition of the ex-
clusionary rule by the court's themselves. Administrative fact-
finding was not to be allowed free rein and the federal courts had
the prerogative to correct the abuse through application of the ex-
clusionary rule.
The decision in Mapp v. Ohio appears to be more in line with
the concepts of the Due Process Model.oo The Mapp Court did
not take a kindly view of abuses in the administrative fact-finding
process. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority stated:
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be se-
cure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, consti-
tutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect
as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer
permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the
name of the law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no
less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of
justice. 10 1
The Mapp decision incorporated all the major tenets of the Due
Process Model. It demanded that administrative fact-finding be
scrupulous and subject to adversary questioning. It limited offi-
cial power and discretion to that strictly allowed by law. The
Mapp holding also greatly expanded the role of the courts as the
appropriate forum to correct prosecutorial abuses by insisting
99. Id. at 392.
100. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
101. Id. at 660.
that state courts be bound by the exclusionary rule. In one final,
important sense the Mapp decision upholds a major tenet of the
Due Process Model-the skepticism about the utility of the crimi-
nal sanction. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion referred to
the alleged crime: "[O]ne must understand that this case is
based on the knowing possession of four little pamphlets, a
couple of photographs and a little pencil doodle-all of which are
alleged to be pornographic."l0 2
One unfortunate aspect of the Due Process Model is the skepti-
cism the model applies to the criminal sanction. In the Weeks,
Mapp and Bivens decisions the Court majority was skeptical of
police actions and of the underlying criminal sanction, yet the
method they chose to combat both was procedural. Justice Doug-
las obviously did not seriously consider the pornography charge
in Mapp, although he did see it as an opportunity to implement
the exclusionary rule. It would certainly be obvious to adherents
of the Crime Control Model, such as Chief Justice Burger, that
the rule and other procedural devices have been used as a
smokescreen by the Due Process Model advocates to shield an at-
tempt to separate the criminal sanction from victimless crimes.
In other words, although the Due Process Model advocates have
not openly urged the removal of criminal sanctions from certain
activities, they have resorted to various ploys that have success-
fully interferred with their imposition.
3. The Tension Between the Models
Although Packer had envisioned the two models of the criminal
process as metaphorical or as polar opposites in order to deline-
ate different belief systems, the unfortunate reality has been that
the adherents of the two models have indeed become polarized.
Crime Control advocates desire harsher sentences and swifter im-
position of punishment. They have not been disposed to debate
the wisdom of the criminal sanction for drug use. They have per-
sisted in relying on alleged misinformation about drug use to but-
tress claims that drug use is a "national epidemic."103 The fact
that drug use crimes occupy an inordinate amount of time on
court dockets, and comprise a large percentage of the motions to
suppress is ignored.
On the other hand, the Due Process adherents have generally
restricted themselves to rearguard procedural defenses. It is the
rare authority that openly challenges the use of the criminal sanc-
102. Id. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring).
103. See Johnson, Once an Addict, Seldom an Addict, 7 CoNT. DRUG PROB. 35
(1978).
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tion for drug use in a public forum.' 04 The increasing polarity on
both sides and the unwillingness to confront the basic issue of
whether or not drug use should be criminal suggests the exclu-
sionary rule must be maintained until some consensus is reached.
Procedural rules have the ability to mitigate the harshness of
competing views on the worth of the criminal sanction.
Procedure is the individual's last line of defense in contemporary civiliza-
tion, wherein all other associations to which he may belong have become
subordinate to the state. The elaboration of procedure, then, is a unique,
if fragile, feature of more fully evolved states, in compensation, so to
speak, for the radical isolation of the individual. 10 5
Conclusion
The exclusionary rule and drug use crimes share a common his-
tory in American Law. Although usually treated as separate top-
ics, the rule and drug use have been conceptually and statistically
intertwined. Further, the debate over the efficacy of the exclu-
sionary rule has been precipitated by the failure of American so-
ciety to satisfactorily resolve the question of drug use and the
imposition of the criminal sanction for their use. The tension pro-
duced by that failure has been conceptually presented by the use
of Herbert Packer's dual model of the criminal process. Until the
national debate over drug use is resolved, the exclusionary rule
remains the viable interim alternative.
JEROME A. BUSCH
104. But see Kurzman, Decriminalizing Possession of All Controlled Substances:
An Alternative Whose Time Has Come, 6 CoNT. DRUG PROB. 245 (1977). The au-
thors stated:
In addition, the present laws encourage the use of questionable investiga-
tive practices. These include entrapment, the use of undercover provocat-
eurs and unreliable informants, manufactured or planted evidence and
perjured testimony to obtain a conviction, unauthorized wiretapping, and
search and seizures in violation of guidelines established to protect civil
liberties. Such practices demonstrate a frightening disregard for constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights. The passage of increasingly repressive laws
which advocate such concepts as preventive detention (District of Colum-
bia), civil commitment (California), mandatory-minimum sentencing prac-
tices (New York), and the erosion of civil liberties through increasingly
expanding police power (no-knock laws, etc.), and the potential for ram-
pant police corruption, when viewed collectively, reveal a terribly bleak
picture. All told, these factors make a compelling argument against a pro-
hibition policy which emphasizes crimes control over due process, and pu-
nitive values over remedial values.
Id. at 250.
105. Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, in THE RULE OF
LAW 140 (P. Wolff ed. 1971).

